Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 9

Issue 2

2008

Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions
J. Atsu Amegashie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
J. A. Amegashie, Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 861 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol9/iss2/19

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

Article 19

J. Atsu Amegashie, "Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions," 9(2) Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech.
861-882 (2008).

Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions
J. Atsu Amegashie*
“Sincerity makes the very least person to be of more value
than the most talented hypocrite.” – Charles Spurgeon1
“To give real service you must add something which cannot be
bought or measured with money, and that is sincerity and
integrity.” – Douglas Adams2
1. INTRODUCTION
In standard economics and game theory, only actions affect
payoffs. Intentions are irrelevant. It is the final outcome that
matters not the process. But there are clearly situations where
intentions affect payoffs. The same action might induce different
payoffs depending on the intentions of the parties or players.
Indeed, intentions matter in important ways. Intention is the
basis for the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter
and partly explains the attitudes of certain groups towards racial
profiling. For murder or manslaughter, the same action (i.e.,
taking a person’s life) may attract a different punishment
depending on whether the action is believed to be premeditated
or not. For racial profiling, a traveler at an airport or a motorist
who is searched by the police may react differently depending on
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whether he believes that the search was random or was
motivated by his race or religion.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the following class of
social interactions or prosocial behavior. Suppose someone offers
to help you but you thought the offer might be motivated by guilt
rather than a genuine desire to help; will you accept the offer?
Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely
accepted by your peers and “friends.” In particular, suppose you
are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc., not because your
company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if
she did not invite you; or you got a job at an elite institution but
you would not have been offered the job if you were not a
minority; or someone gives you a present because they felt
obligated to do so, not because they really wanted to give you a
present. If your boss, supervisor, or professor tells you to feel free
to come talk to her anytime you encounter problems in your
work, would you take her up on that offer if you thought she was
making the offer grudgingly? Does one’s enjoyment from sex
depend on whether her partner’s intention is a long-term
relationship or casual relationship? Will the answer affect the
decision to accept or reject an offer into a sexual relationship? In
all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention behind the
action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. The
intention will matter if the target of the offer is averse to
insincerity.
The average reader may be able to relate to some of these
situations from personal experience. These examples are common
and interesting social interactions worthy of study. They are the
basis of friendships and relationships at work, school, church,
and in our daily lives. They determine whom we choose to go to
lunch with, play with, and in general socialize with. They
determine the frequency and enjoyment of our social interactions.
One may assume that there is already some kind of
superficial, implicit, or lower-level relationship between the two
parties. For example, they may work at the same place or they
may be neighbors. The question is: will the parties necessarily
engage in mutually beneficial trades in a world where the
sincerity of actions matter?
In what follows, I refer to the player who offers to help or
extends an invitation to a social event (e.g., dinner) as the
proposer, and the other player as the responder.
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Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer show that intentions
can also be modeled as stemming from interdependent type
preferences: preferences over someone’s physical or social
characteristics (e.g., race, height, gender, personality).3 In the
social interaction in the present paper, the responder has
interdependent type preferences because he cares about the
proposer’s social type (i.e., whether the proposer is prosocial or
not). Knowledge of the proposer’s social type will help the
responder determine the sincerity of the proposer’s offer and
hence determine the intention behind his offer. This requires that
the responder forms beliefs about the proposer’s social type or
characteristic.
Psychological game theory pioneered by John Geanakoplos,
David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti4 models intentions as beliefs
about beliefs, where players have belief dependent preferences.
There have been important extensions and analysis of this
approach.5
This paper has elements of psychological games and
interdependent type preferences. Both approaches to modeling
intentions in games are complementary. Indeed, John Searle
argues, in a very influential philosophical work, that sincerity is
linked to a person’s state of mind (i.e., his beliefs).6 Insofar as
this paper is concerned with the sincerity of a person’s behavior
or altruism, psychological game theory, a model with
interdependent type preferences, or some combination gives an
appropriate analytical framework.
I find that the beliefs of both parties play a key role in
generating an equilibrium with sincere or insincere offers. In
particular, the beliefs held by the players can lead to an
equilibrium in which the responder does not reject mutually
3. See Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Canonical Type Space for
Interdependent Preferences, 2 (July 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~pesendor/ interdependent.pdf.
4. John Geanakoplos et al., Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality,
1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 60, 61 (1989).
5. See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1284 (1993); Armin Falk et al., On the
Nature of Fair Behavior, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 20, 20 (2003); Gary Charness & Martin
Dufwenberg, Promises and Partnerships, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1579, 1580 (2006);
Armin Falk et al., Testing Theories of Fairness—Intentions Matter 7 (Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working Paper No. 63,
2000), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/ iewwp063.pdf.
6. JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY INTO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 54–71 (1969).
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beneficial trades (i.e., sincere offers), although she is uncertain
about the proposer’s social type. Equilibriums with insincere
offers are also possible. I also discuss the implications of
insincerity aversion for altruism, political correctness, and trust.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, I briefly discuss the role of guilt and insincerity in social
interactions. Section 3 presents a simple model of social
interaction under incomplete information in a dynamic
psychological game and characterizes its equilibriums. I discuss
applications in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. GUILT AVERSION AND INSINCERITY AVERSION
In the social interaction studied, guilt plays an important
role. As Roy Baumeister, Arlene Stillwell, and Todd Hearther note
“. . . guilt is something that happens between people rather than
just inside them. That is, guilt is an interpersonal phenomenon
that is functionally and causally linked to communal
relationships between people. The origins, functions, and
processes of guilt all have important interpersonal aspects.”7
They continue “[t]his is not to deny that some experiences of guilt
can take place in the privacy of one’s individual psyche, in social
isolation. Still, many of those instances may be derivative of
interpersonal processes and may reflect highly socialized
individuals.”8
Building on a well-known idea in psychology, Gary Charness
and Martin Dufwenberg introduce the term guilt aversion to
describe the behavior of people who suffer guilt if they believe
that they have hurt another person because they did not meet
that person’s expectation.9 It refers to the disutility felt from
disappointing others or letting them down. They show how guilt
aversion can sustain good or co-operative behavior.10
In a related contribution, Peter Huang examines how guilt
can motivate securities professionals’ behavior in their fiduciary
relationships with their clients and the legal implications of guilt

7. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Guilt: An Interpersonal Approach, 115 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 243, 243 (1994).
8. Id.
9. Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5, at 1580.
10. Id.

J. Atsu Amegashie, "Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions," 9(2) Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech.
861-882 (2008).

2008]

INTENTIONS, GUILT & SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

865

for the regulation of securities professionals.11 In a different but
related context, Peter Huang and Ho-Mou Wu examine how
remorse can lead to better social order.12 In both papers, the
basic notion is that guilt provides an internal mechanism beyond
the external mechanisms for legal compliance provided by private
litigation, public enforcement, and formal sanctions.13
A very important difference in the present paper is that I
argue that insincere offers, motivated by guilt aversion, impose a
cost (disutility) on the responder. This insincerity-induced
disutility or insincerity aversion produces an effect that is absent
in previous works on guilt aversion.14 In particular, while guilt
aversion in these papers can sustain cooperation or good
behavior, the likelihood of such cooperation may fall because
guilt-induced cooperation may be perceived by one party as
insincere and hence may be rejected because this party dislikes
insincere or forced cooperation.
A person may be a sincerity pragmatist if, in certain contexts,
she may care about sincerity, while in other contexts, she may
not. She may have an intrinsic value for sincerity in certain
situations, as the quote by Douglas Adams at the beginning of
this paper suggests, but may have an instrumental value for
sincerity in other situations. This kind of cost-benefit calculus by
such sincerity pragmatists is alluded to by the Nobel laureate,
Albert Camus when he opined: “[H]ow can sincerity be a
condition of friendship? A taste for truth at any cost is a passion
which spares nothing.”15 In the same vein, John Kang makes a
case for insincerity in a democracy. He argues that insincerity in
public discourse is necessary for tolerance and mutual coexistence in liberal democracies.16 I return to this issue when I
discuss political correctness and other applications in section 4.
11. See Peter Huang, Trust, Guilt and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1059, 1059 (2003).
12. Peter Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of
Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 394–97
(1994).
13. See id.; Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5, at 1585.
14. See Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5; Huang, supra note 11; Huang
& Wu, supra note 12.
15. Quote available at Brainy Quote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
authors/a/albert_camus.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
16. See John M. Kang, The Uses of Insincerity: Thomas Hobbes’s Theory of
Law and Society, 15 LAW & LITERATURE 371 (2003) [hereinafter Kang, Uses]; John
M. Kang, The Case for Insincerity, 29 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 143 (2003)
[hereinafter Kang, Cases].

J. Atsu Amegashie, "Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions," 9(2) Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech.
861-882 (2008).

866

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 9:2

The preceding point calls for reasons why a person may be
averse to insincerity or have a preference for sincerity, and why
such a preference may be driven by instrumental or intrinsic
motivations. Notice that in the above papers17 only one player is
guilt-averse or only one player’s guilt aversion is relevant to the
analysis. My model could be seen as one in which both players
are guilt-averse but for different reasons. Under this
interpretation, the proposer extends insincere offers to assuage
his guilt while the responder dislikes the offers because she feels
guilty if she believes that she is forcing someone to accept her or
be nice to her out of guilt. While the proposer feels guilty for
disappointing others, the responder feels guilty if she believes
that she is manipulating the proposer’s guilt for her personal
gain. The responder does not feel guilty if she rejects an offer.
People may be insincerity averse if they believe that the
intention behind an offer or an apparent prosocial behavior is to
make them feel morally obliged to reciprocate in the future or
requires them to stroke their benefactor’s ego by being held to an
emotional ransom of a perpetual demonstration of gratitude.
Insincerity-aversion may also stem from the belief that those
who act out of guilt are ultimately not trust-worthy. They can
fake their behavior for only a short while but eventually their true
feelings and behavior will come out. So the responder may be
insincerity-averse because she wants to interact with people that
she can trust. To avoid the cost of being unpleasantly surprised,
insincerity-averse people will terminate cooperation sooner than
later.
Related to the previous point is the observation that the
desire to know the sincerity of others in socio-economic
relationships may stem from the fact that knowledge of such
sincerity or the degree thereof may determine the effort that an
insincerity-averse person puts into the relationship.18 The cost of
insincerity is then the cost of over-investing in the relationship
based on the erroneous information or presumption that the
person being dealt with was sincere. In this regard, Claire Hill
and Erin O’Hara examine how the law should intervene to either
promote more accurate trust levels or to mitigate the costs of
17. See Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5; Huang, supra note 11; Huang
& Wu, supra note 12.
18. Interview with Claire A. Hill, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School, in Minneapolis, Minn. (April 6, 2007).
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mistaken assessments in contractual and non-contractual
relationships.19
Ian Ayres and Greg Klass present a lucid and interesting
examination of the legal implications of insincere promises and
misrepresented intent.20 A promise is insincere if the promisor
never intended to fulfill the promise. According to them, a
promisee cares about the sincerity of the promisor because
breach-of-contract damages are not fully compensatory. If such
damages were fully compensatory, a promisee will not care about
the sincerity of the promisor.21 This is consistent with our earlier
point that a person may be insincerity-averse because dealing
with an insincere person is costly.22 However, Claire Hill and Erin
O’Hara observe that full compensation for breach-of-contract
damages may lead to excessive levels of trust in contracting
relationships.23
It is conceivable that in formal and financial matters of the
kind analyzed by Peter Huang,24 a person may have an
instrumental value for sincerity but in non-financial and informal
matters, the same person may be more likely to have an intrinsic
value for sincerity. Indeed, in formal relationships protected by
the law, guilt-aversion is more likely to sustain cooperation
because the law reduces the cost of insincerity, even if it does not
eliminate it. Hence insincerity aversion will matter less in such
relationships than in informal relationships.

19. See Claire Hill & Erin A. O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust 2, 32
(Minnesota Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 05-51, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=869423.
20. See Ian Ayres & Greg Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 507, 508. See generally IAN AYRES & GREG KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES:
THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005).
21. AYRES & KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES, supra note 20, at 61.
22. To be sure, any moral hazardous behavior in a principal-agent
relationship could be considered insincere behavior. However, in a standard
principal-agent model, the principal would not derive any disutility from an
agent who exerts a high effort or desists from moral hazard behavior out of guilt.
The principal only cares about actions not intentions. And if the principal cares
about intentions, it is only in an instrumental sense insofar as intentions affect
actions. In contrast, my model is also applicable to situations where intentions
have intrinsic value for people and therefore the same action will yield different
payoffs depending on the intention behind it.
23. Hill & O’Hara, supra note 19, at 31–32.
24. Huang, supra note 11, at 3–7, 33–35.
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3. A GAME OF SOCIAL INTERACTION WITH GUILT
In this section, I consider a very simple model to examine the
several examples of prosocial behavior mentioned in section 1,
where the sincerity of actions matters. While the model is
applicable to those examples, I use one specific example in this
section for the sake of exposition. In particular, I focus on
situations where the proposer has the option of helping the
responder in an activity. In section 4, I demonstrate how this
simple model can be adapted to the issue of political correctness.
Consider two people, player 1 and player 2.25 Player 1 has
the option of proposing to help player 2 in some activity. Player 1
could be either prosocial, in which case he enjoys helping player
2, or he could be asocial, in which case he grudgingly helps
player 2 out of guilt. Player 2 does not know for sure whether
player 1 is prosocial or asocial.
Furthermore, player 1 feels guilty if he does not offer to help
player 2. Player 1’s guilt depends on the extent to which he
believes that he has disappointed player 2.26 The higher player 1
believes is the level of player 2’s disappointment, the more guilt
player 1 has.
An offer is insincere if player 1 is asocial and it is sincere if
player 1 is prosocial. If player 2 believes that player 1 genuinely
wants to help her, she gets a positive payoff if she accepts player
1’s offer. If she believes that player 1’s offer is insincere, she
incurs a psychic cost if she accepts player 1’s offer. Thus, player
2 will not knowingly accept an insincere offer. However, since she
does not know for sure whether player 1 is prosocial or asocial,
there is some possibility that she might accept insincere offers or
reject sincere ones.
Player 1 has two actions: offer to help or do not offer to help.
Player 2 has two actions: accept or reject an offer from player 1.
The game is sequential. Player 1 is the first-mover and player 2 is
the second-mover.
Player 1 need not show that his offer is out of guilt if he is
asocial. It is sufficient for player 2 to believe that player 1’s offer
is insincere. It is player 2’s inference about player 1’s intentions
25. I use male pronouns for player 1 and female pronouns for player 2.
26. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, Guilt in Games, 97 AM. ECON.
REV. 170, 174–75 (2007). The formulation of guilt in this paper follows the
analysis of Pierpaolo Battogalli and Martin Dufwenberg.
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that matters. Therefore, the same action (i.e., offer) by player 1
could give player 2 different payoffs depending on her beliefs
about player 1’s intentions.
It is important to note that player 1 does not feel guilty so
long as he offers to help player 2, even if he does not want player
2 to accept his offer. If he is asocial, he might offer to help player
2 and if player 2 rejects, then he suffers no guilt. While the
motivation for this behavior may be straightforward, it may be
helpful to elaborate further. One explanation is that player 1 does
not feel guilty because he can justify his behavior on the grounds
that he, after all, took the risk of offering to help player 2. This is
what Baumeister et al. refer to as the deconstruction of guilt. 27
Of course, if player 2 could tell that player 1 extended an
insincere offer with the goal of getting his offer rejected, then a
rejection of an insincere offer from player 2 could make player 1
feel guilty. 28 However, due to incomplete information, player 2
cannot in general be certain of the insincerity of player 1’s offer.
Therefore, due to incomplete information, the rejection of an
insincere offer does not make player 1 feel guilty.29
3.1 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
I looked for psychological perfect Bayesian equilibriums
(PPBE) of this game, defined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) with the additional requirement that players’ endogenous
first-order and higher-order beliefs are correct in equilibrium.30
27. See Baumeister et al., supra note 7, at 259 (noting that by focusing not
on the implications of one’s actions, one can escape guilt); Seinfeld: The
Apartment, infra note 37.
28. Of course, player 1’s guilt need not depend on player 2’s words or
actions. This is at the heart of the distinction between simple guilt and guilt from
blame considered in this paper. See discussion infra Parts 3.1.1, 3.1.2.
29. It may sometimes appear that what we refer to as guilt should actually be
called shame. Accordingly, one may argue that what Pierpaolo Battigalli and
Martin Dufwenberg refer to as guilt from blame should be called shame. See
Battigalli & Dufwenberg, supra note 26, at 172. In order not to get bogged down
by semantics, we do not make this distinction.
30. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy profile that is sequentially
rational given a system of beliefs that is obtained using Bayes rule. Julio
Gonzalez-Diaz & Miguel A. Melendez-Jimenez, A Formal Definition of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games, 2 (June 7, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript,
on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.
kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/gonzalezdiaz/papers/Perfect_Bayesian.pdf.
Bayes’ rule provides a mathematical approach to how one should change his or
her existing beliefs in light of new evidence. In Praise of Bayes, ECONOMIST, Sept.
30, 2000, at 83.
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All proofs can be found in the technical appendix to this paper.31
3.1.1 Simple Guilt
Player 2’s disappointment is a function of the difference
between her expected payoff and her actual payoff. In this simple
guilt formulation, player 1 feels guilty as a result of the
disappointment felt by player 2, even if player 2 does not blame
him for his actions.32
The following proposition holds in this game:
Proposition 1: If player 1 suffers from simple guilt and
player 2 does not expect any insincere offers; player 1 believes
that player 2 does not expect any insincere offers; and player 2
has a sufficiently low valuation for sincere offers and/or a
sufficiently high disutility for insincere offers and/or player 1 has
a sufficiently low sensitivity to guilt, then there exists a
psychological PBE in the social interaction game where all offers
are sincere and player 2 accepts all offers.
We can also state the following proposition:
Proposition 2: If player 1 suffers from simple guilt, then
there exists a PPBE in which player 1 always offers to help player
2. Player 2 rejects player 1’s offer if her valuation of sincere offers
is sufficiently small and accepts player 1’s offer if her valuation of
sincere offers is sufficiently high.
3.1.2 Guilt from Blame
In addition to simple guilt, Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin
Dufwenberg also consider another formulation of guilt, in which
a player who has disappointed another player feels guilty
depending on the extent to which the affected player blames him
for his actions.33 They refer to this as guilt from blame.34
One can interpret simple guilt as the guilt felt from blaming
one’s own self and guilt from blame as the guilt felt from being
blamed by others.35 Unlike guilt from blame, player 1 blames

31. More elaborate arguments can be found in a version of this paper at
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~jamegash/intentions_interaction_psychological.pdf.
32. See Battigalli & Dufwenberg, supra note 26, at 171 (noting that with
simple guilt a player cares about how much he lets another player down).
33. See Battigalli & Dufwenberg, supra note 26, at 175.
34. Id. at 172.
35. Id. at 171–72.
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himself under simple guilt for not offering to help player 2, even if
he is asocial. This makes sense because it is not uncommon for
people to feel guilty, blame themselves for having certain
antisocial preferences, or for being of an antisocial type, even if
they do not change their preferences.
It is implicitly assumed that for the same level of
disappointment incurred by player 2, player 1’s guilt sensitivity is
the same whether he blames himself or he is blamed by player 2.
This may not be the case in practice, although it seems to be the
correct methodological assumption to make. In that way,
differences in equilibrium behavior from these different
formulations of guilt will only be attributed to the differences in
the strategic incentives that they induce as opposed to
differences in a player’s distaste for feelings of guilt.
Note that there can be no guilt from blame when player 1
offers to help player 2 or when player 2 rejects player 1’s offer.
Therefore, guilt from blame is only possible when player 1 does
not offer to help player 2.
In the case of guilt from blame, the proof of the equilibrium of
this social interaction is very straightforward. To this see this,
observe that player 1 feels no guilt if he does not offer to help
player 2 because player 2 will not blame him for doing so. Player
2 understands that if player 1 does not offer to help her, then it
must be the case that he is asocial, or he would only insincerely
offer to help her. Moreover, since player 2 dislikes insincere
offers, she does not get disappointed and so does not blame
player 1.36 Under guilt from blame, player 1 will not extend
insincere offers; hence, all offers are sincere. The proposition
below then follows:
Proposition 3: If player 1 suffers from guilt from blame, then
there is a unique PPBE in which all offers are sincere and no
offers are rejected.
4. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATIONS
Let me begin this section by noting that the story could be
told differently but with similar results. In particular, the timing
of actions could be reversed where player 2 is the first mover and
player 1 is the second mover. In this case, player 2 initiates a
36. She does not infer that player 1 wants to disappoint her. Her inference is
that player 1 is not extending her an offer because player 1 knows that she does
not like insincere offers.
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request by asking player 1 for help or makes no such request.
Player 1’s response to a request for help is yes or no. Player 1
does not feel guilty if player 2 does not ask for help and he does
not offer to help.
Casual empiricism confirms a result akin to proposition 2.
That is, we sometimes do not ask people for favors because we
feel that we may be bothering them and therefore they may help
us grudgingly out of guilt. So player 2 sometimes does not ask for
help, which is equivalent to the cases in which she rejects player
1’s offer in proposition 2.
Suppose player 1 feels guilty if he does not offer to help,
although player 2 has made no request. Indeed, not asking for
help is a signal from player 2 to player 1 that she believes, with a
sufficiently high probability, that he is asocial. Then knowing
that player 2 will reject his offer, player 1 will make an offer
precisely for this reason and thereby assuage his guilt. In this
case, player 1’s offer is akin to a costless action in a cheap-talk
game. This also accords with casual empiricism where we
sometimes make offers to people who we know will not accept our
offer and we, indeed, do not want them to accept our offer.37
In what follows and without loss of generality, I will continue
with the original formulation of the game where player 1 is the
first mover.
Proposition 1 is interesting because it shows that even if
player 2 is suspicious of player 1’s intentions, there are beliefs
which can sustain a PBE where sincere offers are never rejected.
However, proposition 3, relative to the propositions under
simple guilt, is even more interesting. Unlike simple guilt,
proposition 3 shows that under guilt from blame, there cannot be
37. A clear example of this was the April 4, 1991 episode of Seinfeld titled
“The Apartment.” Mrs. Hudwalker, a tenant in one of the apartments where Jerry
is also a tenant, dies and Jerry proposes to Elaine to take the newly vacant and
very cheap apartment just above his own. Later, he realized that it was a big
mistake after talking to George. However, Jerry could not tell Elaine that he did
not want her to live in the same building because he would feel guilty. Luckily,
Kramer found someone who could offer the superintendent $10,000 per month
for the apartment; a sum that Jerry knew Elaine could not afford. Jerry is able to
assuage or deconstruct his guilt by telling himself that Elaine would never know
that he did not want her to have the apartment after the original proposal. To the
extent that TV shows are reflections of parts of our real lives, this Seinfeld
episode clearly shows that people do not only extend insincere offers to assuage
their guilt, but they also do so hoping that such offers will not be accepted.
Seinfeld: The Apartment (NBC television broadcast Apr. 4, 1991).
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equilibriums with insincere offers. This accords with intuition
because if player 2 is averse to insincerity and if player 1 is
sensitive to blame from player 2, then player 2 will place the
minimal blame possible on player 1 mindful of the fact that it is
player 1’s guilt aversion which causes him to extend insincere
offers. With such minimal blame, player 1 has no incentive to
extend insincere offers in order to assuage his guilt. On the other
hand, if player 2’s blame has no effect on player 1’s guilt (i.e.,
simple guilt), then player 2 cannot guarantee sincerity.
Note that player 1 offers to help player 2 if he believes that
player 2 expects an offer and will be sufficiently disappointed
otherwise. This accords very well with casual empiricism. The
emotional cost (i.e., guilt) of disappointing player 2 coupled with
player 2’s expectations could force player 1 to be kind to her,
although he would have preferred to act otherwise.
The preceding observation applies generally to the way we
tolerate others who we would otherwise not have tolerated. In
some cases, we do so only because such people expect to be
treated with respect.
Unlike the equilibriums in propositions 1 and 3, the
equilibrium in proposition 2 involves some insincere offers due to
player 1’s guilt aversion. One may then conclude that guilt
breeds insincerity. While this is sometimes true, proposition 1,
for example, suggests that this is not always the case. In addition
to guilt aversion, the players’ expectations or beliefs play a
crucial role in generating an equilibrium with insincere or sincere
offers. If player 2 expects an insincere offer and player 1 believes
that player 2 expects an insincere offer, then these beliefs
coupled with a high guilt sensitivity may indeed lead to an
equilibrium with insincere offers. On the other hand, if player 2
expects sincere offers and player 1 believes that player 2 expects
sincere offers, then these beliefs coupled with low guilt sensitivity
yield an equilibrium with only sincere offers.
However, even if guilt aversion breeds insincerity, is that
necessarily a bad thing? Not really. As Gary Charness and Martin
Dufwenberg demonstrate, guilt aversion and verbal promises can
create commitment power that may foster trust and
cooperation.38 Peter Huang makes a similar point;39 however, in

38. Charness & Dufwenberg, supra note 5, at 1594–95.
39. Huang, supra note 11, at 1084 (noting that due to loyalty to her client, a
broker would have such guilt aversion that the broker would not misbehave).
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our model guilt aversion need not sustain cooperation or good
behavior because player 2 may perceive player 1 as cooperating
reluctantly or cooperating out of guilt. Therefore, the issue may
not be whether guilt aversion leads to insincerity but whether the
insincerity per se has an adverse effect on the utility of other
relevant players. As argued in section 2, insincerity-induced
disutility is less likely in financial matters of the kind analyzed by
Peter Huang.40
One can adapt the guilt aversion model to political
correctness41 as follows: When player 1 is prosocial, he gets a
benefit from using politically-correct language (e.g., affirmative
action is a good policy). When he is asocial, he prefers to use
politically incorrect language, which imposes a cost on him. This
cost may stem from the mental and emotional effort required to
restrain his language or suppress his true opinion. However,
there is a cost of using politically incorrect language, which
depends on the social norms of using appropriate language or the
expectations of one’s peers. This is the cost of guilt in the model.
Player 2 derives a benefit if player 1’s use of politically correct
language is sincere, and a cost, if it is insincere. When player 1
uses politically-correct language, player 2’s options are to either
treat him with admiration (accept) or treat him with contempt
(reject). If player 1 uses politically incorrect language, then player
2’s payoff is zero. She derives no disutility from politically
incorrect language, so long as it is sincere. An example of such
politically incorrect language may be a member of a majority
group who argues that most minorities at elite institutions would
not have been there in the absence of affirmative action.42
From the above propositions, it is easy to obtain an
equilibrium with sincere politically correct language, as in
proposition 1, and an equilibrium with politically correct
language that may be insincere, as in proposition 2.
40. See id. at 1059–95.
41. Glenn Loury defines a regime of political correctness as “an equilibrium
pattern of expression and inference within a given community where receivers
impute undesirable qualities to senders who express themselves in an ‘incorrect’
way and, as a result, senders avoid such expressions.” Glen C. Loury, SelfCensorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of “Political Correctness” and Related
Phenomena, 6 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 428, 435 (1994).
42. The point is not that people do not find such language offensive. There
are definitely people who do. My focus is on those who do not find such language
offensive, so long as it is sincere.
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Political correctness may have the disadvantage that people
are more likely to be suspicious of each other’s intentions. Hence,
a decrease in social interactions akin to the positive probability of
rejections in the equilibriums in proposition 2 may occur. Again,
an insincere behavior, such as political correctness, need not be
a bad thing even if it causes people to be suspicious of others’
intentions. One thing missing from the model is that player 2
does not derive any disutility from not receiving an offer (i.e., a
disutility from being rejected). If she did, then we could argue
that she derives utility from an offer even if she intends to reject
the offer. Therefore, political correctness need not be a bad thing
if people derive utility from politically correct language per se. For
example, people derive utility from others restraining their use of
racist, anti-semitic, sexist, and homophobic language, even if
they know that these people harbor such thoughts. Indeed,
Stanley Fish argues that some restriction on free speech is
desirable for precisely this reason.43
However, if people do not value political correctness (i.e.,
insincerity) per se, then it could be welfare reducing as in the
present model. To be sure, there are certain situations in which
people prefer insincerity. For example, they may want their peers
to not use racial slurs and instead use politically correct
language. However, these same people may dislike insincerity in
other situations. Player 2 may not want player 1 to offer help if
his offer is insincere. As noted in section 2, such people may be
called sincerity pragmatists. Indeed, as noted in the introduction
and subsequently in the conclusion, John Kang and Judith
Shklar forcefully argue that insincerity is necessary for mutually
peaceful co-existence in a democracy.44
In relationships, which require short-term investments by
both parties, guilt aversion is more likely to support cooperation
because an insincerity-averse person might believe that a guiltaverse person could be behaving sincerely for a short period.
However, if the relationship requires long-term investment, then
an insincerity-averse person would not believe that a guilt-averse
person could sustain his good behavior, so guilt-aversion is less
likely to sustain co-operation. In this case, the insincerity-averse
43. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD
THING, TOO 111 (1994) (noting that it may be politically right to regulate use of
certain hateful language).
44. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 246 (1984); see also Kang, Uses,
supra note 16 at 386; Kang, Cases, supra note 16 at 154.
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person has an instrumental value for sincerity.
On the preceding point, whether a person accepts a
potentially insincere offer depends on the costs of insincerity.
However, there are some people who will accept insincere offers
because forcing people to be nice to them out of guilt gives them
a sense of power. In a different, but related context, imagine an
affirmative action law that requires certain minorities to be
employed at a public institution. A member of a minority group
may feel empowered by working at this place, even if her
superiors hired her reluctantly and therefore do not want her
there. However, whether such a minority decides to work in such
an environment depends on her belief in the legal system to
protect her from unfair treatment while there. Hence, the
expected cost of insincerity will influence her choice. This is
related to Ian Ayres and Greg Klass’s point that a promisee will
not care about the sincerity of a promisor if legal damages are
fully compensatory in the event of a breach of contract.45
The analysis has been based on the assumption that player 1
incurs no cost if his offer is rejected. However, sometimes we do
not invite certain people into closer relationships not because we
do not like them, but because we are not sure if it is appropriate
to offer to help them. By keeping the relationship at the original
lower level, we do upset current dynamics. Indeed, a rejection
could push the relationship to a much lower level.
5. CONCLUSION
I have presented an analysis of a common social
phenomenon. Using a very simple model, I depart from previous
analysis of guilt aversion by taking into account insincerityinduced disutility stemming from guilt aversion. Insincerityaversion affects trust in relationships, cooperative behavior, and
leads to deadweight losses (i.e., mutually beneficial trades may
not be realized).
To quote Judith Shklar,
The democracy of everyday life, which is rightly admired by egalitarian
visitors to America, does not arise from sincerity. . . . Not all of us are
even convinced that all men are entitled to a certain minimum of social
respect. Only some of us think so. But most of us always act as if we

45. AYERS, supra note 20, at 62.
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really did believe it, and that is what counts.46

However, as the analysis in this paper points out, people
driven by guilt may choose to be insincere when sincerity need
not disturb mutually peaceful co-existence. On the other hand,
sincerity pragmatists may be insincerity-averse in certain
situations but not in others. The “truth” hurts, but not always.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Consider two people, 1 and 2. Player 1 has the option of
proposing to help player 2 in some activity. Suppose that nature
gives player 1 a social type which is his private information. If
person 1 is of social type wH > 0, then he derives a psychic benefit
(joy) of wH from helping player 2. If he is of social type wL, then he
incurs a cost of wL > 0 of helping player 2. Let the probability
distribution of these types be such that Pr(wH) = p and Pr(wL) = 1p, p ∈ (0,1) . Furthermore, player 1 feels guilty, if he does not offer
to help player 2. I assume that player suffers a guilt cost denoted
by G.
Player 1’s guilt depends on the extent to which he believes
that he has disappointed player 2. In particular, I assume that G
= αD2, where D2 is the disappointment felt by player 2 when
player 1 does not offer to help her and α is a positive parameter
that captures player 1’s sensitivity to guilt. I shall endogenize D2
but it is easier to do so when part of the solution to the game has
been discussed. This is because D2 depends on endogenous
second-order beliefs making the game a dynamic psychological
game.
An offer is insincere if it is extended by player 1 of type wL
and it is sincere if it is extended by player 1 of type wH.
If player 2 believes that player 1 genuinely wants her
company or wants to help her, she gets a utility, v > 0, given that
she accepted player 1’s offer. If she believes that player 1’s offer is
insincere, she incurs a psychic cost of θ > 0, given that she
accepted player 1’s offer.
Let v be a random variable that is commonly known to be
continuously distributed on [ v, ~
v ] with density f(v) and
corresponding distribution function, F(v), v > 0. I assume that
F(v) is a strictly increasing function. I assume that v is player 2’s
private information but θ is common knowledge.
After observing his social type, player 1 has two actions: offer
46. SHKLAR, supra note 44, at 77.
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to help (I) or do not offer to help (N). Player 2 has two actions:
accept (A) or reject (R) an offer from player 1. The game is
sequential. Player 1 is the first-mover and player 2 is the secondmover.
Player 1’s payoff is
(a) u1 = wH, if he plays I, his social type is wH, and player 2
plays A;
(b) u1 = -wL, if he plays I, his social type is wL, and player 2
plays A;
(c) u1= -G, if he plays N;
(d) u1 = 0, if he plays I and player 2 plays R.
Player 2’s payoff, assuming for a moment that she knows
player 1’s social type, is
(i) u2 = -θ, if she plays A, given that player 1 of type wL played
I;
(ii) u2 = v, if she plays A, given that player 1 of type wH played
I;
(iii) u2 = 0, if she plays R.
Player 1 need not show that his offer is out of guilt when his
social type is wL. It is sufficient for player 2 to believe that player
1’s offer is insincere. It is player 2’s inference about player 1’s
intentions that matters. Therefore, the same action (i.e., offer) by
player 1 could give player 2 different payoffs depending on her
beliefs about player 1’s intentions. Given that given v > 0, player
2 would accept any offer from player 1 if she did not care about
player 1’s intentions.
The players have common priors. All this information is
common knowledge. In what follows, I assume that player 2 has
intrinsic value for sincerity.
Equilibrium Analysis
I look for psychological perfect Bayesian equilibriums (PPBE)
of this game.
Note that if player 1 plays N, then player 2 does not have to
respond. So player 2’s behavior is restricted to her response
when player 1 plays I. For player 1, I consider both decisions (i.e.,
offer to help or not offer to help).
Let σ ∈ [0,1] be the probability that player 2 rejects an offer
from player 1 and let λ ∈ [0,1] be the probability that player 1 will
offer to help player 2 when his social type is wL. Notice that when
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player 1’s social type is wH, it trivially follows that he will offer to
help player 2 with certainty.
Given player 1’s strategy, player 2 computes the posterior
probabilities

ρ L ≡ ρ ( wL I ) =

ρ ( I wL ) Pr( wL )
λ (1 − p )
=
∑ ρ ( I wi ) Pr( wi ) λ (1 − p) + p

(1)

i= L, H

and

p
λ (1 − p) + p
Note that ρ( w H I) > p for λ ∈ [0,1) .
ρ H ≡ ρ( w H I) =

(2)

Player 2’s expected equilibrium payoff if she accepts an offer
from player 1 could be written as

U 2 (λ ) = ρ( w H I) v − ρ( w L I)θ

(3)

Player 2 rejects an offer, if U 2 (λ ) < 0. It follows that player 2
of type

v̂(λ) =

ρ( w L I)θ λ(1 − p)θ
=
is indifferent between accepting or
ρ( w H I)
p

rejecting an offer. Therefore,
v̂ ( λ )

σ=

∫ f (v)dv = F(v̂(λ))

(4)

v

Then it immediately follows that ∂σ / ∂λ > 0. Hence, player 2
increases her rejection probability, if she believes that the
probability of insincere offers is higher.
Simple Guilt
Let λ1 be player 2’s first-order belief of λ and player 1’s belief
(second-order) of λ1 be λ 2 .47
If player 2 does not get an offer from player 1, her actual
payoff is zero. If she gets an offer and she accepts it, then she
expects a payoff of U 2 (λ1 ) > 0. So if she plans on accepting an
offer, then her disappointment, given that she did not get an
offer, is U 2 (λ1 ) – 0 > 0. On the other hand, if she rejects an offer,
she must believe that her payoff if she had accepted it would
47. As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, supra note 26, I consider beliefs, at
most, of the fourth order.
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have been U 2 (λ1 ) < 0. So in this case, her disappointment from a
non-offer is U 2 (λ1 ) – 0 < 0. So she actually suffers no
disappointment from not getting an offer.
Based on the above discussion, we may write player 2’s
disappointment as
D2( λ1 , v, θ) = max [ U 2 (λ1 ) - 0, 0]
(5)
Player 1 needs to determine his optimal offer probability, λ.
But to do so he has to form beliefs about λ1 since D2( λ1 , v, θ) is a
function of λ1 . Hence player 1’s optimal choice of λ depends on
his second-order beliefs (i.e., λ2) of λ and thus on player 2’s
expectation of the equilibrium play of the game. Player 1’s payoff
does not only depend on player 2’s actions but also depends on
his endogenous beliefs of player 2’s beliefs. Indeed, since ρH
≡ ρ( w H I) is a function of λ, it follows that player 1’s payoff
depends on his beliefs of player 2’s updated beliefs of his social
type. Therefore, we may write player 1’s cost of guilt as
G = αD2(ρH( λ 2 ), v, θ).
I abuse notation by rewriting player 1’s cost of guilt as
G = αD2( λ 2 , v, θ),
(6)
where α > 0 is common knowledge and, as defined before,
measures player 1’s sensitivity to guilt. The formulation in (6)
makes this game a psychological game where player 1 has beliefdependent preferences about player 2’s updated belief about his
social type.
It is important to reiterate that player 1 might feel guilty if
and only if he does not offer to help player 2, and does not feel
guilty if player 2 rejects his offer. Indeed, as argued above, player
2 feels no disappointment if she rejects player 1’s offer.
Since player 1 knows θ and knows the distribution of v, he
uses the expected value of v (i.e., v ) in his decision making. That
is, he assumes that player 2’s disappointment from a non-offer is
D2 = max[ ρ H v − (1 −~ ρ H )θ , 0], where
ρ H v − (1 − ρ H )θ = ∫vvU 2 (⋅)dF( v) .
I characterize the equilibriums of this game under the
following three exhaustive cases: (a) σ < 1- G/wL, (b) σ = 1- G/wL,
and (c) σ > 1- G/wL.
Case (a): σ < 1- G/wL
Suppose λ1 = λ 2 = 0. Then player 2 believes that player 1 will
not offer to help her when his social type is wL. Player 1 also
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believes that player 2 believes that player 1 will not offer to help
her when his social type is wL. Suppose also that (1-σ)wL >
α{max[ ρ H v − (1 − ρ H )θ , 0]}= α( ρ H v − (1 − ρ H )θ ) > 0. Then player
1’s optimal response is λ= 0. Note that
(1-σ)wL > α( ρ H v − (1 − ρ H )θ ) = G > 0 holds if v is sufficiently low
and/or θ is sufficiently high and/or α is sufficiently low. This
gives proposition 1 in the text.48
Case (b): σ > 1- G/wL
Now suppose that λ1 = λ 2 = λ = 1. Also, assume that –(1 – σ)wL
> – α(ρH v – (1- ρH)θ) , where ρH = p and ρH v – (1- ρH)θ > 0. This
gives proposition 2 in the text.
Note that we do not have to worry about out-of-equilibrium
beliefs in any of the equilibriums above. Suppose that in
proposition 2, player 2 observed an out-of-equilibrium action of N
by player 1. Then the game ends, so player 2’s beliefs are
irrelevant. In proposition 1, player 1 plays either N or I with
positive probability, so player 2 will continue to update her beliefs
using Bayes’ rule.
It is straightforward to apply the model to a situation in
which player 2 has an instrumental value for sincerity. Imagine
that accepting player 1’s offer requires an investment, e, by
player 2 into an activity, which yields a net benefit of Ve if player
1 is sincere and cost of θe if player 1 is insincere. This cost may
be incurred because player 1 of type wL does not put enough
effort into the activity. However, player 2 will not suffer this cost
if player 1 exerts the required effort, regardless of whether he did
so out of guilt or wholeheartedly. The cost of effort to player 2 is
C(e) which is an increasing and strictly convex function. Then
player 2’s expected payoff is U2(e, λ1) = [ρHv – (1- ρH)θ]e – C(e). It
immediately follows that e*(λ1) = argmax U2(e, λ1) =
C′−1 (ρH v − (1 − ρ H )θ) . The inverse of C′(e) exists because it is a
monotonic function. Clearly, e* is decreasing in λ1 and by the
envelope theorem, U2(e*(λ1), λ1) is also decreasing in λ1. Then D2 =
max[U2(e*(λ1), λ1) – 0, 0] is also decreasing in λ1 for U2(e*(λ1), λ1) >
0.49
Player 1 of type wL extends an offer hoping that player 2 will
*

48. In proving this proposition, I assumed that ρ H v − (1 − ρ H )θ > 0. This
proposition also holds if ρH v − (1 − ρH )θ ≤ 0 which gives G = αD2 = 0.
49. Of course, player 2 will set e* > 0 if and only if U2(e*, λ1) > 0. Otherwise,
she will set e* = 0.
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reject it. In doing so, he compares (1 – σ)wL to G = αD2. But if
player 2 accepts the offer, then ex post, player 1 of type wL will
not invest in the activity (i.e., renege on his offer to help) if wL >
G. This latter condition is consistent with (1 – σ)wL > G and (1 –
σ)wL ≤ G. By imposing the restriction wL > G, player 1 of social
type wL will always be insincere ex post (i.e., after his offer has
been accepted). Hence whether player 2 has an intrinsic or
instrumental value for sincerity makes no difference to the
analysis. Therefore all the above propositions continue to hold.

